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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
search and seizure. The right of privacy must yield at some point to the
right of search 30 and only intelligent rulings by detached magistrates,
mindful of established limitations, will insure the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.
The "mere evidence" distinction was in may ways a troublesome one.
In dealing with it courts often found it necessary to confine or enlarge its
definition in a particular case. The ruling in the instant case provides a
logical end for the rule and is not surprising in the light of recent court
decisions.3
1
ALAN F. CAIN.
ESTATE TAX MARITAL DEDUCTION: ELIGIBILITY OF A BEQUEST IN TRUST
PROVIDING FOR MONTHLY PAYMENTS TO WIDOW. Decedent's will created a
trust which gave his wife $3001 a month from the trust income and a
testamentary power of appointment over the entire corpus. Decedent's
executor included the interest in determining the estate's marital de-
duction. The Commissioner ruled the interest did not qualify and
assessed a deficiency in the estate tax. The executor paid the de-
ficiency and sued for a refund. The district court entered summary
judgment for the executor, 2 which was reversed by the circuit court
of appeals.3 On writ of review the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the district court. Held, a bequest in trust which provides de-
cedent's spouse with a monthly stipend and power to appoint the entire
corpus qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction. Northeastern
Pennsylvania National Bank & Trust Company v. United States, 87 S. Ct.
1573 (1967).
Since an estate tax is assessed upon property which passes at death,
4
community property states initially enjoyed a distinct advantage over
common law states. Each spouse in a community property state had a
vested interest in half the community estate, so only the decedent's por-
tion was taxable at his death. As a factual matter, in common law states
the husband had legal title to a majority of the property. If he prede-
ceased his spouse this property might be taxed not only upon his death,
but also upon the death of his wife.
*°Johnson v. United States, supra note 19, at 14.
"See supra note 15.
'Because the martial deduction is computed as of the date of the decedent 's death,
Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 508 (1964), the parties agreed that al-
though the trust provided for increasing the wife's interest to $350 a month when
her youngest daughter reached 18, this had no bearing on the amount of the
marital deduction.
'Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 235 F. Supp. 941 (D.C.Pa. 1964).
sNortheastern Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966).
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2001.
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Congress first attempted to equalize the estate tax burden by treat-
ing community property as property held in joint tenancy or tenancy by
the entirety for estate tax purposes. 5 This only shifted the burden to the
community property states,6 so in 1948 Congress enacted legislation which
attempted to treat common law estates as community property estates.7
The estate tax was deferred until death on half the adjusted gross estates
which the surviving spouse inherited.9 Since equalization of the tax bur-
den was to be achieved by two-stage taxation and not by allowing tax
free transfer of property, only interests taxable at the second spouse's
death qualified for the deduction.' 0 These were interests which resembled
a fee." The 1948 law allowed the marital deduction if a surviving spouse
received a life interest in the entire trust and a power to appoint the
corpus either to herself or to her estate.1 2 Consequently, partial interests
in trusts did not qualify for the deduction.' 3
In 1954 the deduction was extended to partial interests in trusts by
allowing the deduction ". . . if his [the settlor's] surviving spouse is en-
5INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 811 (e) (2), added by § 402(b), 1942 Act.
61'In one respect the 1942 Act taxed community property even more severely
than jointly held property. In the case of a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the
entirety, nothing is taxed upon the death of the tenant, who has contributed nothing
to the joint estate. However, in the case of community property, if the spouse
who had not contributed to the acquisition of the property died, the 1942 Act
required any part of the community property over which the decedent had a power
of testamentary disposition to be included in the taxable estate. As a practical mat-
ter this meant that if the spouse responsible for the accumulation of community
property died, all of the community property would be taxed to his estate; while
if the other spouse died first half the property would be taxed." LOWNDES AND
KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 372 (1956).
INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 812(e).
"The adjusted gross estate is a concept introduced by the 1948 Act whose sole
function is to furnish a ceiling for the marital deduction. Where community
property is not involved, the adjusted gross estate is the gross estate less the
deductions for expenses,, indebtedness, and taxes and losses enumerated in sections
2053 and 2054." LOWNDES AND KRAMER, supra note 6, at 374.
'The Act of 1948 did not absolutely disallow use of the marital deduction by spouses
in community property states. What the Act did was bar any community property
from being included in the decedent's adjusted gross estate.
"ITNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 812 (e) (1) (B).
'In community property states the rule excluding one-half of the community property
from taxation is based on the notion that the surviving spouse owns one-half of
such property. Such one-half interest is generally an absolute fee simple interest.
The statute allowing the marital deduction is based on the premise that the
survivor ought to have something similar to a fee simple in order to maintain an
estate tax equilibrium between states using the differing systems of property law.
To permit a life interest to qualify for the deduction would result in a loss of
taxation on the remainder since it is already vested and therefore would not pass
through the surviving spouse 's estate.
IINT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 812(1) (F). This power of appointment made the
life interest taxable at the surviving spouse's death.
"Estate of Sweet v. Comm'r, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956) (power to appoint
one-half of the value of the adjusted gross estate) ; Estate of Hoffenberg v. Comm'r,
22 T.C. 1185 (1954) (power to appoint two-thirds of the corpus and accumulated
income); Estate of Shedd v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 41 (1954) (right to two-thirds of
the income and power to appoint one-half of the corpus); Estate of Bickers v.
Comm'r, Tax Ct. Mem. 1958-68 (power to invade corpus to the extent of $15,000).
To ease the burden of this provision, courts in isolated instances interpreted the
decedent's will as creating separate trusts for each beneficiary instead of a common
trust for all of them. Estate of Barry v. Comm'r, Tax Ct. Mem. 1956-97.
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titled for life to all the income from the entire interest, or all the income
from a specific portion thereof ... with power in the surviving spouse to
appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion . . ."14 (emphasis
added.)
Instead of settling the law, however, the 1954 amendment only
created a new controversy, this time centering around the meaning of
the words "specific portion."
The House and Senate reports concerning the 1954 amendment con-
tained examples which described as a fraction the interest qualifying as a
"specific portion." 15 The Treasury Department interpreted this to mean
that a fractional description was necessary to create a "specific portion"
and included this interpretation in a treasury regulation.'6 The theory
of the regulation was two-fold. First, only a fractional description could
absorb the appreciation in value of the corpus, thus avoiding any tax
free transfer of capital appreciation.'7 Second, only a fractional descrip-
tion would place on the beneficiary the risk of depreciation in value, a
risk which is shared by spouses in community property states.18
Three federal courts disagreed with the Treasury Department. 9
These courts allowed partial interests to qualify for the deduction even
ITNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b)(5). The Technical Amendments Act of 1958,
72 Stat. 1606 (1958), applied the 1954 amendment retroactively to estates of de-
cedents dying after April 1, 1948, and before August 17, 1954. Concerning the
Technical Amendments Act the Court said, "Plainly such a provision should not be
construed so as to impose unwarranted restrictions upon the availability of the
deduction." Instant case at 1578.
T H.R.Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. (1954) as set out in U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4461-4462 (1954); S.Rep. No. 1622 83d Cong. 2d Sess. (1954) as
set out in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5118-5119 (1954).
16,,A partial interest in property is not treated as a specific portion of the entire
interest unless the rights of the surviving spouse in income and as to power [of
appointment] constitute a fractional or percentile share of a property interest so
that such interest or share in the surviving spouse reflects its proportionale share
of the increment or decline in the whole of the property interest to which the
income rights relate." Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1954). Administrative
regulations are either legislative or interpretative. Most of the Treasury Regulations
are of the latter type and may or may not carry the force of law. "This Court has
long given considerable and in some cases decisive weight to Treasury decisions
and to interpretative regulations of the Treasury and other bodies that were not
of adversary origin. We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason
of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such
a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors giving it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control." Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944); 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 298-306 (1958).
"A simple example is the instance where the testator creates a trust of 400 shares
of stock, his wife to receive the income from and power of appointment over 200
of such shares. In the event of a stock split the trust corpus would consist of 800
shares. The resulting 200 share increase in her interest would become part of
the corpus which had already been taxed, thus freeing the capital appreciation
from taxation at her death.
sIf the surviving spouse receives the right to $300 a month from a trust's income
she is guaranteed this income though it might take the entire corpus to produce
it if the capital should depreciate.
"Gelb v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962); Allen v. United States, 250 F. Supp.
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though the ratio of the partial interest to the total corpus was not
expressed in a fractional form. They reasoned that the treasury regula-
tion was an overly strict interpretation which would frustrate the pur-
pose of the 1954 amendment which was to broaden the application of the
marital deduction allowance. 20
In the first of these cases, Gelb v. Commissioner,21 a widow was pro-
vided with all the trust income and power to appoint the corpus, except
a portion sufficient to supply her minor daughter with $5,000 a year. The
Second Circuit Court refused to apply the treasury regulation and
allowed the deduction although the non-fractional description of the
power of appointment would permit her to appoint any capital apprecia-
tion of her daughter's portion. The court said:
Congress spoke of a "specific portion," not a fractonal or percentile
share, and nowhere indicated any policy that deductibility of a "spe-
cific portion" should be governed by the possibility that the spouse's
portion will change in value relatively more or less than the clearly
nonqualifying part.... A basic purpose of the marital deduction was
to reduce the discrimination against taxpayers not in communityproperty states. The liberalization in the provision as to trusts, made
in the 1954 Code and applied to earlier years by the Technical
Amendments Act, was evidently designed to permit certain normal
testamentary dispositions without the total forfeiture of the deduc-
tion that the 1939 Code had occasioned in some instances. 22
In the second case, Allen v. United States, 23 the widow was given a
right to all the income and the power to withdraw $5,000 a year from
the corpus. Though depreciation or appreciation in value of the corpus
would vary the portion the widow could invade in relation to the total
corpus, the court still permitted the deduction. The court did not feel
it was "necessary to examine further the legislative history where the
statute itself is not ambiguous. '2
4
In Citizens National Bank of Evansville v. United States25 an interest
composed of income of $200 a month and a general testamentary power
of appointment over the entire corpus qualified for the deduction. The
deduction was allowed although the widow's income interest would be
insulated from depreciation. The court relied upon Gelb and Allen.26
155 (E.D.Mo. 1965); Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville v. United States, 359 F.2d
817 (7th Cir. 1966).
2'Gelb v. Comm'r, supra note 21, at 551.
2"Gelb v. Comm'r, supra note 21.
'Gelb v. Comm'r, supra note 21, at 551.
'Allen v. United States, supra note 21.
"Id at 157.
'Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville v. United States, supra note 21.
-OId. at 820, 821. The seventh circuit court also relied upon the reasoning of the
district court in the instant case, which had not yet been reversed by the third
circuit court. Id. at 821. One of the reasons the Supreme Court granted certiorari
was the discrepancy between the third circuit court's disallowance of the deduction
and the Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville case in which the seventh circuit court
allowed the deduction. Instant case at 1575-1576.
1967]
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Allen and. Citizens National Bank of Evansville did not expand the
reasoning of Gelb. They simply applied the Gelb rationale to different
facts. All three cases involved a non-fractional description of the "specific
portion" the spouse was to receive. In Gelb the description related to the
portion of the trust which the widow could not appoint, while in Allen
it concerned the amount the widow could appoint. Citizens National Bank
of Evansville concerned a stipulated income provision. Thus, the three
cases established the rule that a "specific portion" of the income or power
of appointment could be described in non-fractional form although such a
description would permit any capital appreciation to escape taxation,
or insulate the beneficiary from any depreciation in the value of the
principal.
Although the Third Circuit Court in the instant case disallowed the de-
duction, it recognized that the fractional form requirement of the treasury
regulation had not been accepted in prior decisions.27 The circuit court
distinguished the instant case on the basis that actuarial computation
was not feasible. 28 There were no constant investment factors from which
the maximum income of the corpus could be determined. 29
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Third Circuit Court, held that
actuarial computation was feasible and developed a theory of "feasibility
of computation" which would allow deduction of interests that do not
contain a constant investment factor. After discussing the history of the
deduction the Court determined that Congress intended a "liberal 'estate-
splitting' possibility to married couples."3 They then concluded that the
Third Circuit's deci;ion was an overly strict interpretation of the marital
deduction:
To be sure, perfect prediction of realistic future rates of return is
not possible. However, the use of projected rates of return in the
administration of the federal tax laws is hardly an innovation. It
should not be a difficult matter to settle on a rate of return available
to a trustee under reasonable investment conditions, which could
be used to compute the "specific portion" of the corpus whose income
is equal to the monthly stipend provided for in the trust. As the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in Gelb, "The use
of actuarial tables for dealing with estate tax problems has been so
widespread and of such long standing that we cannot assume Con-
gress would have balked at it here; the United States is in business
with enough different taxpayers so that the law of averages has
ample opportunity to work."3 1
'"Suffice it to say, even assuming its [the treasury regulation] invalidity we have
been unable to conceive of a method to compute the 'specific portion' of the trust
corpus to which the surviving spouse is entitled to all the income for her life."
Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank, supra note 3, at 484.
I 'Feasible computation of a specific portion is the key to martial deduction statutes.'
Id. at 483.
"Thus, in this case, the factual constants do not exist upon which the maximum
income can be theoretically computed, as it was possible to theoretically compute
the maximum of corpus in Gelb. In short, the ratio between the maximum monthly
income and the monthly stipend- the fraction of the entire corpus which could
be the specific portion for martial deduction purposes- may not acceptably be
computed." Id. at 484.
'Instant case at 1578.
'Instant case at 1579.
[Vol. 29
5
Harney: Recent Decisions
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1967
RECENT DECISIONS
The basic policy of the marital deduction will be fulfilled by allow-
ing the deduction in these instances. Otherwise, an interest may be taxed
twice although it seems to be "fairly within the language and underlying
policy" of the statute.3 2 The liberality of the Court in construing "spe-
cific portion" offends the traditional policy of construing tax deduction
statutes against the taxpayer,8 3 but this rule of construction is not abso-
lute.3 4 The Supreme Court's ruling should have obviated the necessity for
further legislation to interpret the present Act. Ironically, the dissent
in Citizens National Bank of Evansville may best have described the ambit
of "specific portion"-" . . . something judicially rationalized as approxi-
mately equivalent . . .,,s5
THOMAS A. HARNEY.
HUSBAND AND WIFE: HUSBAND'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A BAR TO
WIFE'S ACTION FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM. Gene Hall was seriously injured
by reason of the negligence of the United States, but was denied recovery
because of his own contributory negligence. His wife, Josephine Hall, was
denied recovery for loss of consortium. Josephine Hall then moved for a
new trial or in the alternative to amend the findings and conclusions
entered to permit her to recover for loss of consortium. Held, that under
Montana law, a husband's contributory negligence bars a wife's recovery
from a negligent third party for loss of consortium. Hall v. United States,
266 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1967).
The term "consortium" has been variously defined by different courts
and not one definition would be acceptable in all jurisdictions.' Under
8 3Gelb v. Comm 'r, aupra note 21, at 551.
3The dissent in the instant case lamented the interpretation of a tightly worded
tax statute as if it were a workmens compensation act. Instant ease at 1682. Tra-
ditionally, courts have construed tax deduction statutes against taxpayers. Empire
Trust Go. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Stapf v. United
States, 189 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Empire Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 94 F.2d 307
4th Cir. 1938) ; Jackson v. United States, supra note 1, at 510.
84 'And in denying the deduction, the courts have been less concerned with the
underlying philosophy of the martial deduction than they have been with main-
taining the so-called legislative principle that 'deductions should be strictly con-
strued against the taxpayer and in favor of the sovereign.' This attitude, too, has
played its part in subverting the original purpose of Congress of equalization
between the different property systems . . . . If we consider these cases and
the judicial attitude they reflect from the viewpoint of equalization, we see that the
represent a frustration of that objective."' Paul E. Anderson, Marital Deduction and
Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and
Community Property States. 54 MICH. L. Rv. 1087, 1111 (1956).
S5Citizens Nat 'l Bank of Evansville v. United States, supra note 21, at 822.
'Technically, "consortium" is an element of damage rather than an action. The
expression has long been used by the courts, however, to denote those actions in
which injury to consortium is the major element of damage. The following defini-
tion is typical of most: "Conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right
of each to the company, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every con-jugal relation." BLACE's LAw DiCTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
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